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STANDING UP TO “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAWS: HOW
THE MODERN NRA-INSPIRED SELF-DEFENSE STATUTES
DESTROY THE PRINCIPLE OF NECESSITY, DISRUPT THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, AND INCREASE OVERALL
VIOLENCE
DANIEL SWEENEY
ABSTRACT
A majority of states have enacted “Stand Your Ground” laws. Proponents argue
that such laws enhance the important right of self-defense. In application, however,
“Stand Your Ground” laws have had a negative impact on society. First, “Stand
Your Ground” laws ignore the common-law element of necessity that traditionally
provided a check on unreasonable self-defense. Second, “Stand Your Ground” laws
create presumptions that remove important discretionary powers from law enforcers,
prosecutors, and judges. Third, studies have shown that “Stand Your Ground” laws
may actually increase violent crime. The “Stand Your Ground” movement continues
to enjoy a great degree of political success due to its formula of politicizing violent
street crime, and exploiting the public’s fear of victimization, as well as its overall
distrust of the criminal justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
On the night of November 5, 2004, Jimmie Morningstar, a forty-three-year-old
cable salesman, was planning on having an enjoyable evening in Palm Beach,
Florida.1 This was the first night of a two-week vacation from work, and he decided
to celebrate the occasion at the local alehouse.2 While at the bar, Morningstar drank
heavily and became intoxicated to the point that he was cut off from further drinks,
and was asked to leave.3 Morningstar, who was described that night as “unruly,”
refused to leave.4 A bar employee, presumably trying to both convince Morningstar
to leave and also make sure he reached home safely, called him a cab.5
The cab driver, Robert Smiley, arrived at the bar and drove Morningstar to his
apartment, which was less than a mile away.6 Upon arriving at the apartment,
Morningstar refused to get out. Smiley then forcibly removed him by zapping him
with a stun gun.7 Although it is unclear exactly what transpired after this, it appears
that Morningstar, who was now outside of the taxi, tried to get back in. Smiley, who
had a firearm, responded by first yelling at Morningstar, then firing two warning
shots, and finally shooting him twice in the chest, killing him.8 Smiley later testified
at trial that Morningstar flashed a knife, although one was never found.9
On October 1, 2005, less than a year after Smiley killed Morningstar, and while
the case was pending, the Florida legislature passed a new bill that significantly
altered the state’s self-defense laws.10 This bill, called the Protection of Persons/Use
of Force Bill,11 is commonly known as the “Stand Your Ground” law.12 The
1 Missy Diaz, Plea Deal Averts Trial for Taxi Driver, SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 23, 2007),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2007-02-23/news/0702230082_1_plea-deal-jimmie-morningstarrobert-smiley.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9
Adam Liptak, 15 States Expand Right to Shoot in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/us/07shoot.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print
(“[T]here is evidence to support that the victim came at Smiley after Smiley fired two warning
shots, and that he did have something in his hand.”) (quoting Smiley’s defense attorney).
10

2005 Fla. Laws 199, 202 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 776.013, 776.032).

11

Id.

12 See, e.g., Steve Bousquet, Legislature Say’s Let the Force Be With You, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES ONLINE (Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.sptimes.com/2005/04/06/
State/Legislature_say_s_let.shtml (characterizing it as the National Riffle Association’s “right
to murder” bill); Liptak, supra note 9 (stating that critics of the law characterize it as a “shoot
first” law).
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controversial new bill expanded a person’s right to use deadly force by creating a
presumption that a defender, in his or her home, has a reasonable fear of imminent
death or bodily harm when an intruder unlawfully enters, granting criminal and civil
immunity, and abolishing the common law “duty to retreat.”13 Robert Smiley, who
eventually pleaded guilty to manslaughter after two mistrials,14 waged a lengthy
legal battle in which he moved the court to permit jury instructions based on the
newly enacted “Stand Your Ground” law.15 Although his motion was ultimately
denied, a Florida District Court of Appeals acknowledged that if Smiley did not have
a duty to retreat, “[it] would substantially affect the legal consequences attached to
Smiley’s conduct.”16 The implication being, of course, that if Smiley had done the
same act just a year later, after the passage of the new bill, he may have been legally
justified in his use of deadly force.
Following Florida’s lead, a majority of states have enacted “Stand Your Ground”
laws.17 Despite the widespread success that legislators have had in passing these
bills, there is fierce and growing opposition to the laws, due in large part to several
high profile cases. Perhaps most notable among these is the Trayvon Martin-George
Zimmerman incident18 that occurred in Florida in 2012, where Zimmerman, a
13 Florida Legislation—The Controversy Over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground”
Law—FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005), 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 351, 355-56 (2005) [hereinafter
Florida Legislation].
14

Diaz, supra note 1.

15

State v. Smiley, 927 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).

16

Id. at 1002-03

17

See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 229 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter
DRESSLER, 5th ed.].
18 There is considerable debate as to whether Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” provisions
had an effect on Zimmerman’s trial. See Kris Hundley, Despite Backlash, “Stand Your
Ground” Laws Did Not Apply to Zimmerman Case, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 15, 2013),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/despite-outcry-zimmermans-acquittal-wasnot-based-on-stand-your-ground-laws/2131629 (“Experienced prosecutors and law professors
agreed that they think jurors were swayed by basic self-defense arguments made by
Zimmerman's attorneys: Regardless of who initiated the encounter, at the moment the deadly
shot was fired, Zimmerman feared for his life.”); Zimmerman to Argue Self-Defense, Will Not
Seek “Stand Your Ground” Hearing, CNN (May 1, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/30/
justice/florida-zimmerman-defense (explaining that the “Stand Your Ground” law was not at
issue because Zimmerman waived his right to a pretrial immunity hearing); see also Dan
Abrams, No, Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law Did Not Determine Either Zimmerman or
Dunn Case, ABC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/floridas-stand-groundlaw-determine-zimmerman-dunn-cases/story?id=22543929 (“[N]either defendant [referring to
Michael Dunn trial as well] invoked the controversial aspects of Florida's law. In fact, both
defendants argued basic self-defense law that would have been similar in just about every
state in the nation . . . . [T]he duty to retreat was not an issue in either Dunn or Zimmerman. In
both cases the defendants argued that deadly force was used because they ‘reasonably’
believed that it was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily injury. That, is at its
core, no different than the law in almost every other state.”); Report: Zimmerman Told Police
Teen Punched Him Before Fatal Shooting, CNN (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/
03/26/justice/florida-teen-shooting (stating that under Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law,
Sanford police could not initially arrest Zimmerman). But see Nicole Flatow, Why Stand Your
Ground Is Central To George Zimmerman’s Case After All, THINKPROGRESS (July 15, 2013,
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neighborhood watch volunteer, shot and killed unarmed seventeen-year-old Trayvon
Martin.19 Zimmerman, claiming that he acted in self-defense, was ultimately
acquitted of second-degree murder charges by a Florida jury.20 This verdict ignited a
passionate and divisive national debate on the issues of racial profiling21 and civil
rights, and also brought a great deal of attention to Florida’s “Stand Your Ground”
law.22
This Note will argue that “Stand Your Ground” laws destroy the common-law
element of necessity; disrupt the criminal justice system by taking away important
discretionary power from law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges; and increase
violence. Part I will give a brief overview of the common-law elements of selfdefense. This section will also discuss several states’ departure from the “duty to
retreat” with the prevalence of the “true man doctrine” and will then explore
Florida’s self-defense statute that expanded the lawful use of deadly force.
Part II will begin by arguing that Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law is
problematic for three reasons. Section A will argue that the “duty to retreat” is an
important aspect of the necessity element, and that its removal undermines the
societal value of preserving human life. Section B will argue that statutory
presumptions and immunity provisions disrupt the criminal justice system and offer
little guidance to law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges. Section C, relying on
recent empirical evidence, will argue that “Stand Your Ground” laws not only fail to
deter violent crime but actually increase it. Finally, Section D will examine the
politics of the “Stand Your Ground” movement by analyzing the three core
components of the movement’s formula.

1:59 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/07/15/2301621/why-stand-your-ground-iscentral-to-george-zimmermans-case-after-all (arguing that, although Zimmerman’s lawyer
never specifically raised “Stand Your Ground” as a defense, the jury instructions explicitly
stated that “he had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand his ground and meet force with
force”).
19 Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmermanverdict-trayvon-martin.html.
20

Id.

21

For example, President Obama spoke in highly personal terms about the Trayvon
Martin verdict:
You know, when Trayvon Martin was first shot I said that this could have been my
son. Another way of saying that is Trayvon Martin could have been me 35 years ago.
And when you think about why, in the African American community at least, there’s a
lot of pain around what happened here, I think it’s important to recognize that the
African American community is looking at this issue through a set of experiences and
a history that doesn’t go away.
Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President on Trayvon Martin (July 19, 2013, 1:33
PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/remarks-president-trayvonmartin.
22

Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 19.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/10

4

2016]

STANDING UP TO “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAWS

719

I. BACKGROUND
A. Common-Law Tradition of Self-Defense Law
1. Elements of the Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense
Every jurisdiction in the United States recognizes an individual’s right to use
force, including deadly force, in self-protection.23 Self-defense, which is considered
a “justification”24 defense, has several elements: At common law, a non-aggressor is
justified in using [deadly]25 force upon another if he reasonably believes such force
is necessary to protect himself from imminent use of unlawful [deadly] force by the
other person.26 This rule contains three principal elements: (1) necessity; (2)
proportionality; and (3) reasonable belief.27
a. Necessity
The necessity element requires that force, including deadly force, should only be
used to the extent that it is necessary.28 The underlying principle behind necessity as
23
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 221 (6th ed. 2012) [hereinafter
DRESSLER, 6th ed.] (noting that if a state legislator were to abolish the right of self-defense, it
would likely violate the Second Amendment, under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570 (2008)). Historically, English common law has long recognized the idea of justified
homicide. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *186.
24 DRESSLER, 5th ed., supra note 17, at 222 (“Justified conduct is conduct that under
ordinary circumstances is criminal, but which under the special circumstances encompassed
by the justification defense is not wrongful and is even, perhaps, affirmatively desirable.”).
Dressler also provides a brief summary of various justification principles, such as “Public
Benefit,” “Moral Forfeiture,” “Moral Rights,” and “Superior Interest.” Id. at 222-25.
25

The definition of “deadly force” varies by jurisdiction. DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note
23, at 223. Some jurisdictions take an objective approach and look at whether the force was
“likely” or “reasonably expected” to cause death or serious bodily injury. Id. These
jurisdictions consider the actor’s state of mind irrelevant. Id. Other jurisdictions take a
subjective approach, and include a mental-state element by defining deadly force as force
“intended” to cause death or serious bodily injury. Id. Still other states take a hybrid approach.
In Ohio, “deadly force” means any force that carries a substantial risk that it will proximately
result in the death of any person. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(2) (West 2016).
26 DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 221-22. “Deadly” is in brackets because the same
rule is applied to self-defense situations not involving deadly force. Although the principal
elements of common law self-defense are well established, courts often apply them with
varying formulas. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ((1) “There must have been a threat, actual or apparent, of the use of deadly force
against the defender. [(2)] The threat must have been unlawful and immediate. [(3)] The
defender must have believed that he was in imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm,
and that his response was necessary to save himself therefrom. [(4)] These beliefs must not
only have been honestly entertained, but also objectively reasonable in light of the
surrounding circumstances.”); State v. Gheen, 41 S.W.3d 598, 606 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(“[T]he defendant (1) must not have acted as an aggressor, (2) must have reasonable grounds
for believing he faced immediate danger of serious bodily injury; (3) must not have used more
force that what appears reasonably necessary; and (4) must do everything in his power,
consistent with his own safety, to avoid the danger and retreat if possible.”).
27

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 221-22.

28

Id.
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it relates to deadly force is that all human life, even the life of a violent criminal, is
valuable and worthy of protection.29 Accordingly, having the right to use force that is
capable of killing another human being should be reserved only for those situations
in which a person being attacked has no other alternatives. Under the common law,
force is only considered necessary when confronted with an imminent or
“immediate” threat.30 This rule precludes a preemptive attack, even if it appears an
impending threat is inevitable.31 The necessity element also precludes the use of
deadly force to combat an imminent deadly assault if a non-deadly response would
be sufficient to repel the attack.32 Lastly, and most controversially, the necessity
element, in some jurisdictions, does not allow the use of deadly force against an
attacker when there is a completely safe avenue of retreat.33 This last aspect of the
necessity element is known as the “duty to retreat,” and will be covered in more
detail later in this Note.
b. Proportionality
The proportionality element places a limit on the maximum amount of force that
one may use to protect oneself.34 The amount of force used to protect oneself must
not be excessive in relation to the harm with which one is threatened.35 For example,
in a common-law jurisdiction, a person may not use deadly force to protect his or her
property even if deadly force was the only way to prevent the property from being
stolen or damaged. The proportionality element reflects the societal value that it
would be a great injustice to allow one to use deadly force against someone
committing a non-violent offense such as trespassing, theft, or vandalism.
c. Reasonable Belief
The reasonable belief element in self-defense law contains both a subjective and
an objective inquiry.36 The first question is whether the actor subjectively believed
that deadly force was necessary to repel an imminent unlawful attack.37 The second
question is whether the actor’s belief was one that a reasonable person in his same
situation would have possessed.38 This objective view of a subjective state-of-mind
standard means that an individual may satisfy this element even if it later turns out
that the threat was not, in fact, imminent, or there was a completely safe avenue of
29

Id. at 228.

30

E.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989).

31
DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 230; see, e.g., Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 191
(Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
32

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 222.

33

Id.; see also Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 237, 241 (2008) (explaining historical basis for the “duty to retreat” on
theory that the English Crown had a monopoly on violence).
34

PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 86-88 (1984).

35

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 222.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 222-23.
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retreat.39 As long as the actor’s subjective belief that the force was imminent or that
there was not a safe retreat available is a belief that a reasonable person in his same
situation40 would have possessed, the reasonable belief element is met.
2. The Duty to Retreat and the Castle Doctrine Exception
As explained previously, jurisdictions are split on whether an individual under
imminent attack has a “duty to retreat” before using deadly force if he knows of a
completely safe avenue of retreat.41 Today, a majority42 of jurisdictions have
eliminated the “duty to retreat” and allow one to use deadly force even if he knows
he can retreat in complete safety.43 However, a sizeable minority still adheres to the
common-law rule that requires retreat when there is a known and safe place to
escape to.44 Supporters of the “duty to retreat” argue that it is an essential component
of the necessity element. If one is confronted with deadly force, but knows for
certain that he can escape the altercation, then using deadly force against his attacker
is not truly necessary.45 Requiring retreat is also an acknowledgment that both the
law and society value the preservation of human life above one’s “manly” or “brave”
response of confronting an attacker.46 Supporters also point out that the rule does not
increase the risk of harm to innocent people because retreating is only required when
one is both subjectively aware of a place of complete safety and also believes he can
actually retreat with safety.47
Supporters of the “no-retreat” rule argue that the law should be in accordance
with the behavior of reasonable men.48 A rule that discourages the “manly” response
of standing one’s ground by requiring the “cowardly” act of retreat conflicts with
society’s values of bravery and standing up for oneself.49 Another argument is that a
“no-retreat” rule deters violent crime because criminals are now put on notice that
innocent civilians can fight back.50 Additionally, a “no-retreat” rule instills
confidence in law-abiding citizens and lets them know that in the event they find
39

Id. at 223.

40

See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986) (emphasis added).

41

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 226.

42

See AM. BAR ASS’N, NAT’L TASKFORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS, A REVIEW OF
PRELIMINARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 52-53 (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/racial_ethnic_justice/aba_natl_ta
sk_force_on_syg_laws_preliminary_report_program_book.authcheckdam.pdf.

THE

43

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 227.

44

Id. at 228.

45

See id. at 226.

46
Id. at 228. The idea of having the right to stand up to an aggressor, and not being
required to engage in the “cowardly” act of retreat will be explored later. See infra Part I.B.1.
47

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 228.

48

See State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1961).

49

Id. (“[T]he advocates of no-retreat say the manly thing is to hold one's ground, and
hence society should not demand what smacks of cowardice.”).
50

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 227.
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themselves in a life-threatening situation the law will support their decision to
defend themselves, rather than second-guess it.51 Finally, supporters of the “noretreat” rule argue that a “duty to retreat” is an archaic doctrine that has no place in a
modern society with firearms.52
The common-law exception to the “duty to retreat” is the “castle doctrine,”
which allows one to use deadly force to protect oneself in his or her home, even if a
safe retreat is available.53 The doctrine, expressed by the maxim that “every man’s
house is his castle,”54 provides that “a non-aggressor is not ordinarily required to
retreat from his dwelling, even though he knows he could do so in complete safety,
before using deadly force in self-defense.”55 Every jurisdiction has a castle doctrine,
and in some states it has been expanded to places beyond the home such as hotel
rooms and vehicles.56 The “castle doctrine” is justified because it preserves two
important societal values: (1) “defense of habitation”57 and (2) the idea that one’s
home is viewed as a final “sanctuary”58 to protect oneself from external threats.59
B. Rise of “Stand Your Ground” Laws
1. Historical Roots: The “True Man” Doctrine
More than a century before Florida passed its controversial self-defense law, a
number of jurisdictions in the United States outright rejected the English common-

51

Liptak, supra note 9; see also Adam Cohen, The Growing Movement to Repeal “Stand
Your Ground” Laws, TIME (Apr. 16, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/16/the-growingmovement-to-repeal-stand-your-ground-laws (stating that “Stand Your Ground” laws prevent
citizens from being second-guessed by the legal system).
52

See Robert Leider, Understanding “Stand Your Ground,” WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304432704577350010609562008 (“With the
prevalent use of firearms, the retreat requirement has limited application today. Individuals
usually cannot know that they can retreat in complete safety when facing aggressors armed
with guns.”); see also State v. Gardner, 104 N.W. 971, 975 (Minn. 1905) (“The doctrine of
‘retreat to the wall’ had its origin before the general introduction of guns. Justice demands that
its application have due regard to the present general use and to the type of firearms.”); P.
Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle AssociationInspired Statutes, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1, 15 n.77 (explaining that advances in weaponry have
made retreating from an attack impracticable, and that the law should reflect these advances).
53

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 228.

54
See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288 (“[E]very man’s house is looked
upon by the law to be his castle.”).
55

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 228.

56

DRESSLER, 5th ed., supra note 17, at 230-31.

57
The “defense of habitation” value stresses the sanctity of one’s home and the
proprietary interest in protecting it from intruders. Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy
Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 658 (2003).
58 The value of the home as a “sanctuary” from attack suggests that one’s home is
precisely the kind of “known and safe place” envisioned by the “duty to retreat” rule. Id.; see
also Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1052 (Fla. 1999).
59

See Carpenter, supra note 57, at 672-73.
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law “duty to retreat.”60 The idea that a citizen had a right to stand his ground and kill
in self-defense without being required to retreat came to be known as the “true man”
doctrine.61 This doctrine, rooted in notions of honor62 and the “American mind,”63
idealized the “true man” who stood up to his adversaries, and was especially
prevalent in the newly expanding South and West.64 In the late nineteenth century,
even the United States Supreme Court expressed its approval of the “true man”
doctrine, holding that:
The weight of modern authority, in our judgment, establishes the doctrine
that when a person, being without fault, and in a place where he has a
right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel force
by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self-defense, his
assailant is killed, he is justifiable.65
In that same case, the Court upheld an earlier decision by the Supreme Court of
Ohio, which famously held that “a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to
fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life
or do him enormous bodily harm.”66
Although the “true man” doctrine was never codified, and some of its followers,
such as Texas,67 eventually reverted back to common-law principles, it left a lasting

60

See Leider, supra note 52.

61

See Suk, supra note 33, at 243-46.

62 See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat From a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567,
577 (1903).
63

See RICHARD M. BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY AND SOCIETY 17 (1991).
64

See Leider, supra note 52; Suk, supra note 33, at 243.

65

Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 562 (1895).

66

Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199-200 (1876). Although at first glance this holding
seems to support the idea that Ohio rejected the common-law “duty to retreat,” this is not quite
the case. The court, reviewing and commenting on several treatises on English criminal law,
distinguished between justified and excused homicide. If the killing was justified, there was no
duty to retreat, but if it was excused, there was such a duty. Id. at 197-99. The court explains
the distinction by quoting Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons, of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts:
“[a] man may repel force by force in defense of his person against any one who
manifestly intends, or endeavors by violence or surprise, feloniously to kill him. And
he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he has secured himself
from all danger; and if he kill him in so doing, it is justifiable self-defense. But a bare
fear, however well grounded, unaccompanied by any overt act indicative of such
intention, will not warrant him in killing. There must be an actual danger at the time.”
Id. at 198 (quoting Commonwealth v. Selfridge (Mass. 1806)).
67
See Denise M. Drake, The Castle Doctrine: An Expanding Right to Stand Your Ground,
39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 573, 577-85 (2008) (explaining the history of self-defense law in Texas:
“Self-help was the remedy of choice, often handled by ‘Judge Winchester’ or ‘Judge
Lynch’”). In 1973 the Texas legislature imposed a duty to retreat to help overcome its “Wild
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impression on American jurisprudence. The ideals of bravely defending oneself from
wrongful aggressors and “standing one’s ground” in any place one had a right to be
would resurface in the twenty-first century and would soon become the rule among
the majority of states.
2. Florida S.B. 436
On April 26, 2005, Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed into law Senate Bill 436,
which expanded the right to use deadly force in Florida.68 The bill, which received
overwhelming support69 from both Republicans and Democrats, was originally only
intended to codify the common-law “castle doctrine,” which allows a person to use
deadly force when attacked in the home.70 However, the National Rifle Association
(“NRA”), which lobbied vigorously for the Bill and was instrumental in its
passage,71 was able to convince the Florida legislature to remove a provision saying
that one had a “duty to retreat” when attacked outside the home.72 Prior to the
passage of this bill, Florida followed the common-law “duty to retreat” rule, which
did not allow the use of deadly force unless the person used “every reasonable means
to avoid the danger, including retreat.”73 The new law not only removed the
provision requiring a “duty to retreat,” but went a step further and explicitly
denounced it, stating:
A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with
this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand
his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force

West image.” Id. at 582-83. In 2007, however, Texas became a “Stand Your Ground” state
and eliminated its duty to retreat. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(c) (West 2016).
68

Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/27/us/florida-expands-right-to-usedeadly-force-in-selfdefense.html?_r=0.
69
Florida’s House of Representatives approved the bill 94-20, and the Senate passed it
39-0. Id.
70

Steve Bousquet, Legislature Says Let the Force Be with You, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.sptimes.com/2005/04/06/State/Legislature_say_s_let.shtml.
71 See Jennifer Randolph, Comment, How to Get Away with Murder: Criminal and Civil
Immunity Provisions in “Stand Your Ground” Legislation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 612
(2014) (explaining how Florida’s 2005 self-defense legislation was conceived by former NRA
President Marion P. Hammer); Ross, supra note 52, at 16.
72

Bousquet, supra note 70.

73 See, e.g., State v. James, 867 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The rationale
for requiring retreat was explained by Justice Overton of the Florida Supreme Court: “Human
life is precious, and deadly combat should be avoided if it all possible when imminent danger
to oneself can be avoided.” State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724, 728 (Fla. 1982); see also Florida
Legislation, supra note 13, at 354.
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is not engaged in a criminal activity74 and is in a place where he or she has
a right to be.75
In addition to removing the “duty to retreat,” Florida’s new self-defense law also
strengthened its “castle doctrine”76 by creating a presumption that one attacked in his
home, temporary place of lodging, or vehicle has a “reasonable fear of imminent
death or great bodily harm” when another “was in the process of unlawfully and
forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or
occupied vehicle.”77 This presumption is significant because the same Florida statute
only allows the use of deadly force if a person “reasonably believes that using or
threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a
forcible felony.”78 The law created yet another presumption that “[a] person who
unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s dwelling, residence, or
occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful
act involving force or violence.”79 Although there are exceptions to these
presumptions,80 it appears that if the presumption does, in fact, apply, it is conclusive
and cannot be rebutted.81

74

Florida’s self-defense provisions provide that aggressors or those engaged in criminal
activity have a duty to retreat. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.041 (West 2016).
75

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(2) (West 2016).

76

The Florida Supreme Court explained the rationale for it:

“It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is
bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground and resist the attack. He is
under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home.
More than 200 years ago it was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale: In case a man ‘is
assailed in his own house, he need not flee as far as he can, as in other cases of se
defendendo [self-defense], for he hath the protection of his house to excuse him from
flying, as that would be to give up the protection of his house to his adversary by
flight.’ Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home
. . . The rule is the same whether the attack proceeds from some other occupant or
from an intruder.”
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049-50 (Fla. 1999) (quoting People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E.
496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.)).
77

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(1)(a) (West 2016). The expansion of the “castle doctrine”
also includes attached porches, any type of vehicle, and a place of temporary lodging,
including tents. JUDICIARY COMM., S.B. 436 STAFF ANALYSIS 6 (2005).
78

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(2) (West 2016).

79

Id. § 776.013(4).

80 Presumptions about the intent of the intruder do not apply if the intruder: (1) has a right
to be in the house, lodging, or vehicle; (2) is seeking to remove a person lawfully under his or
her care from a home, lodging, or vehicle; or (3) is a law enforcement officer, acting lawfully,
and the defender had a reason to know that the intruder was a law enforcement officer.
JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 77, at 5.
81
Id. at 6; see also Drake, supra note 67, at 590-92 (2008) (explaining that the “critical
distinction” between Texas and Florida’s self-defense statutes is that Florida’s presumption
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Lastly, the new law grants criminal and civil immunity to those who use force in
accordance with the statute.82 Immunity from criminal prosecution means that a
person cannot be arrested, detained in custody, or charged.83 Law enforcement
officers are not permitted to arrest a person claiming self-defense “unless [they]
determine that there is probable cause that the force that was used or threatened was
unlawful.”84 In addition, those charged with a crime have the right to a pre-trial
immunity hearing where a judge decides whether the facts establish a self-defense
immunity.85
Following Florida’s lead, a majority of states86 have passed bills that remove the
“duty to retreat” and many other states are considering similar bills.87 The NRA
openly declared that it plans to introduce “Stand Your Ground” bills in every state
and has a systematic plan for attaining “broad national support.”88 Unsurprisingly,
these laws also face a great deal of opposition, especially from police chiefs and
prosecutors who consider the laws unnecessary and likely to lead to increased
violence.89
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Elimination of the “Duty to Retreat”
Having a legal right to use deadly force is an incredible power. If granted, a state
is permitting a private citizen to take the life of another human being. Because
human life is sacred, and the killing of another person is such an extraordinary
measure, a society must determine the limited instances in which it will lawfully
was intended to be conclusive, while the Texas presumption is rebuttable); Daniel Michael,
Florida’s Protection of Persons Bill, 43 HARV. J. LEGIS. 199, 201 (2006).
82

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2016) (“[A] person who uses or threatens to use
force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is
immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use or threatened use of such force .
. . .”).
83

Id.

84

Id. § 776.032(2). This provision may explain why George Zimmerman was not initially
arrested after killing Trayvon Martin.
85

See Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).

86

AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 42, at 52-53. States that have statutorily removed the “duty
to retreat”: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id.
87

Liptak, supra note 9.

88

Goodnough, supra note 68. NRA Vice President Wayne LaPierre revealed that his
organization’s strategy would be to start in Republican-controlled states first: “We will start
with red and move to blue . . . . In terms of passing it, it is downhill rather than uphill because
of all the public support.” Id.
89
States Signing onto NRA-Backed Law to Expand Use of Deadly Force, USA TODAY
(May 24, 2006, 8:41 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-05-24deadlyforce-laws_x.htm.
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authorize deadly force. The British common law, upon which the American
common-law system is based, allowed a non-aggressor to use deadly force in selfdefense if he reasonably believed that it was necessary to protect himself from the
imminent use of unlawful deadly force by another.90 This rule, justified on grounds
of self-preservation,91 placed a limit on the extraordinary power of deadly force by
requiring its use to be necessary. As the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Peterson
explained:
The law of self-defense is a law of necessity; the right of self-defense
arises only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the
necessity; and never must the necessity be greater than when the force
employed defensively is deadly. The necessity must bear all semblance of
reality, and appear to admit of no other alternative, before taking life will
be justifiable as excusable.92
Similarly, the same court in Laney v. United States stated:
It is a well-settled rule that, before a person can avail himself of the plea
of self-defense against the charge of homicide, he must do everything in
his power, consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger and avoid the
necessity of taking life. If one has reason to believe that he will be
attacked, in a manner which threatens him with bodily injury, he must
avoid the attack if it is possible to do so, and the right of self-defense does
not arise until he has done everything in his power to prevent its
necessity.93
In both Peterson and Laney, the court stressed the common-law understanding of
necessity and believed “avoidance” and having a lack of “alternatives” to be crucial
components. As explained previously, a society that restricts the use of deadly force
to only those situations when it is necessary to protect oneself is saying that all
human life, even that of criminals, is sacred.94 It would be an obvious affront to
human dignity if the law, for example, allowed the use of deadly force when it was
merely “convenient.” The high standard of the necessity requirement promotes the
high value society places on preserving human life because a potentially deadly
altercation will either be, (1) avoidable, in which case the adversaries are not
lawfully permitted to use deadly force, or (2) unavoidable in which case the nonaggressor will be lawfully permitted to use deadly force to protect himself. Notice
that both situations promote the value of preserving life: in the first situation neither
side was harmed, and in the second situation, since the harm was unavoidable, the
law allowed the innocent party to use deadly force to preserve his or her own life.
90

DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 221.

91

BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *186 (“[T]he great universal principle of selfpreservation, which prompts every man to save his own life preferably to that of another,
where one of them must inevitably perish.”).
92

United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (internal citations
omitted).
93

Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

94

See DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 228.
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One way that courts can determine whether a deadly altercation was avoidable,
and thus unnecessary, is to see whether the person who employed the deadly force
could have safely withdrawn from the situation.95 At the common law, if a safe
escape route was available, the person had a “duty to retreat” and could no longer
use deadly force.96 As the court in Peterson explained, “[t]his doctrine was but an
application of the requirement of strict necessity to excuse the taking of human life,
and was designed to insure the existence of that necessity.”97
In Brown v. United States, Justice Holmes rejected the lower court’s jury
instructions regarding the “duty to retreat,” and remarked, “the failure to retreat is a
circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine whether the
defendant went farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical proof of
guilt.”98 In State v. Abbott, the New Jersey Supreme Court, after conducting a
thorough review of the “duty to retreat” held, “[w]e are not persuaded to depart from
the principle of retreat. We think it salutary if reasonably limited.”99 Both courts
understood that the “duty to retreat” was only an aspect of necessity, which could
help determine whether the requirement was properly satisfied.
Another important limitation on the “duty to retreat” is it is only required if there
is a completely safe avenue of retreat.100 In order for there to be a completely safe
avenue of retreat the person under attack must, (1) subjectively know of a safe
location; and (2) subjectively know that he or she can escape without being injured,
even slightly.101 Under these strict requirements a court would not, for example,

95

See Peterson, 483 F.2d at 1234.

96

Id. (“Within the common law of self-defense there developed the rule of ‘retreat to the
wall,’ which ordinarily forbade the use of deadly force by one to whom an avenue for safe
retreat was open.”).
97

Id.

98

Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (emphasis added). The lower court’s
jury instruction stated, “[I]t is necessary to remember, in considering the question of self
defence, that the party assaulted is always under the obligation to retreat so long as retreat is
open to him, provided that he can do so without subjecting himself to the danger of death or
great bodily harm.” Id. at 342. Further, the Brown Court emphasized, “[T]he instruction was
reinforced by the further intimation that unless ‘retreat would have appeared to a man of
reasonable prudence, in the position of the defendant, as involving danger of death or serious
bodily harm’ the defendant was not entitled to stand his ground.’” Id.
99
100

State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1961) (emphasis added).
See DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 222.

101

See Abbott, 174 A.2d at 885-86 (1961) (“What constitutes an opportunity to retreat
which will defeat the right of self-defense? As . . . the Model Penal Code states, deadly force
is not justifiable ‘if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with
complete safety by retreating.’ We emphasize ‘knows' and ‘with complete safety.’ One who is
wrongfully attacked need not risk injury by retreating, even though he could escape with
something less than serious bodily injury. It would be unreal to require nice calculations as to
the amount of hurt, or to ask him to endure any at all. And the issue is not whether in
retrospect it can be found the defendant could have retreated unharmed. Rather the question is
whether he knew the opportunity was there, and of course in that inquiry the total
circumstances including the attendant excitement must be considered.”).
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require retreat from a person being threatened by a firearm.102 While it is rare for
courts to require retreat, when courts do require it, it often involves cases in which a
person, involved in a confrontation, leaves, then later returns to the scene with the
intent to kill his adversaries.103 In sum, a person’s failure to retreat before using
deadly force in self-defense can, in limited circumstances, be an important
consideration for a court when determining whether the person acted out of
necessity.
Explaining the limitations of the “duty to retreat” is important because
proponents of “Stand Your Ground” laws often exaggerate its significance, and
characterize the duty as an unfair burden that prevents law-abiding citizens from
defending themselves.104 According to Florida State Representative Dennis Baxley,
who sponsored the “Stand Your Ground” Bill, the “duty to retreat” puts a person “at
great risk.”105 Marion Hammer, an NRA lobbyist in Florida, suggests that a court
applying the common-law rule would require a woman to retreat if someone “tried to
drag [her] into an alley to rape her.”106 While “Stand Your Ground” supporters
continue to make bold and provocative mischaracterizations that distort the “duty to
retreat,” they never seem to cite a specific example from a case where a court
unfairly required one to retreat.107 Instead, the campaign to expand the use of deadly

102

See id. at 884 (“[I]t is correctly observed that one can hardly retreat from a rifle shot at
close range. But if the weapon were a knife, a lead of a city block might well be enough.”).
103 See, e.g., Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Rowe v. United States,
370 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2009), http://www.tampabay.com/stand-your-ground-law/cases/case_27
(describing an incident that occurred in Florida in 2009: Two men got into an argument at a
party; one briefly left to retrieve gun from his car, then returned, shooting and killing the
other; the state attorney dropped the charges because the defendant “had no duty to retreat”).
104 See States Signing onto NRA-Backed Law, supra note 89 (explaining that the “duty to
retreat” gives victims an “unfair burden”); Florida House Subcommittee Stands Firm on Selfdefense, NRA, INST. LEGIS. ACTION (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20131108/
florida-house-subcommittee-stands-firm-on-self-defense (“A duty to retreat in the face of
attack protects the life and safety of an attacker and jeopardizes the life and safety of a
victim.”) (quoting Marion Hammer, former president of the NRA).
105 Op-Ed: Why I Wrote “Stand Your Ground” Law, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 26, 2012,
2:40 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/26/149404276/op-ed-why-i-wrote-stand-your-groundlaw (interview with Florida State Representative Dennis Baxley).
106

Mary Anne Franks, Stand Your Ground’s Woman Problem: Laws Expanding Self-Defense
Raise Questions About Gender as Well as Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/stand-your-grounds-woman-_b_4886650.html.
107

Representative Baxley’s explanation for why Florida needed the law involved a selfdefense situation in which the person using deadly force was never even indicted:
[T]he impetus for Florida came after five hurricanes. We had communities being
looted. A 77-year-old gentleman brings in an RV to stay there to protect his property
from looting. He was invaded in the RV by a perpetrator. He shot this individual, and
it was months before he knew whether he might be charged for a crime for simply
defending himself, and, of course, he had to hire defense attorneys to do so.
Op-Ed: Why I Wrote “Stand Your Ground” Law, supra note 105.
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force has been motivated by misleading rhetoric, and, as one commentator puts it, “a
panicked bunker mentality.”108
What is interesting about Florida’s current self-defense law is that it has removed
the duty to retreat, but retains the necessity element. Section 776.012 of Florida’s
“Stand Your Ground” law states, “[a] person is justified in using or threatening to
use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such
force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or
herself . . . .”109 This provision is essentially the common law self-defense rule, with
slightly different wording.110 The statute then removes the “duty to retreat,” stating:
A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force . . . does not have a
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person
using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal
activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.111
As expected, these two provisions are problematic because they create a potential
contradiction. First, the law only allows the use of deadly force if the person using it
reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily injury.
However, the law explicitly allows one to “stand his ground” and use deadly force,
even if, for example, the individual could escape with complete certainty. In other
words, the law requires necessity, but also refuses to take into consideration a fact
that may rebut it. Florida’s definition of necessity is conditional: to use deadly force
a person must reasonably believe that the force was necessary to protect himself, but
the fact that the altercation may have been completely avoided by departing from the
scene is irrelevant.
The Jimmie Morningstar-Robert Smiley incident factually illustrates the
problems with the law. Smiley, the cab driver, likely had a “completely safe avenue
of retreat” once he had forced Morningstar out of his cab. Morningstar, who at this
point was extremely intoxicated and likely still recovering from being tased, was
unarmed and standing in the road. All Smiley had to do to diffuse the situation was
to drive away. It is difficult to imagine a jury would find that Smiley reasonably
believed shooting Morningstar was necessary to protect his life, as required by
common law. One simple way to show that the act was unnecessary is to show
Smiley had the opportunity to safely retreat. Florida’s new law, however, explicitly
prevents courts from considering this. Instead, the jury instruction might say
something like:
If Robert Smiley was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was
attacked in any place where he had a right to be, he had no duty to retreat
and had the right to stand his ground and meet force with force, including
deadly force if he reasonably believed that it was necessary to do so to

108
David Simon, A Brutal Reprise in Florida, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 25, 2012),
http://davidsimon.com/a-brutal-reprise-in-florida. David Simon is the creator of the critically
acclaimed HBO show The Wire.
109

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(2) (West 2016) (emphasis added).

110

See DRESSLER, 6th ed., supra note 23, at 223.

111

§ 776.012(2) (emphasis added).
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prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or another or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.112
While a jury might find Smiley guilty under these instructions, the inclusion of
the phrase “he had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand his ground and meet
force with force” as well as the jury’s inability to even consider whether he could
retreat, certainly could have impacted the outcome. This is especially troubling
because it defies common sense: what better proof is there that Smiley’s act of
shooting Morningstar was not necessary than the fact that he could have easily
driven away from the situation? In any event, a Florida court’s acknowledgement
that a “no-retreat” rule “would substantially affect the legal consequences attached to
Smiley’s conduct” shows just how significant a role the “duty to retreat” could play
in certain cases.113
B. Statutory Presumptions and Immunity Provisions
One obvious challenge with Florida’s (and other states’) comprehensive overhaul
of its self-defense laws is its application by law enforcement, prosecutors, judges,
and by extension, juries.114 Section 776.013 of Florida’s law states:
(1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent
peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when
using or threatening to use defensive force that is intended or likely to
cause death or great bodily harm to another if:
(a) The person against whom the defensive force was used or
threatened was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering,
or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or
occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to
remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling,
residence, or occupied vehicle; and
(b) The person who uses or threatens to use defensive force knew or
had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful
and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.115
While this may seem like a somewhat reasonable provision at first glance,
consider how difficult it would be, if not impossible, for a prosecutor to convict
someone of using unlawful deadly force on his or her property. Take, for example, a
situation involving neighbors in Clearwater, Florida, in which an argument over the
112

These are the jury instructions used in the George Zimmerman case. Jury Instructions,
State v. Zimmerman, 2012 CF 1083 A (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2013), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/
projects/ftrials/zimmerman1/Zimjuryinstructions.pdf.
113

See State v. Smiley, 927 So. 2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 220). Not only would it
be more difficult to convict Morningstar under Florida’s new self-defense laws, he could not
even be arrested unless police can “determine that there is probable cause that the force that
was used or threatened was unlawful.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2016).
114

See Kris Hundley et al., Florida “Stand Your Ground” Law Yields Some Shocking
Outcomes Depending on How Law is Applied, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 1, 2012),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/florida-stand-your-ground-law-yields-someshocking-outcomes-depending-on/1233133.
115

FLA. STAT. ANN § 776.013 (West 2016).
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local garbage rules turned deadly.116 Kenneth Allen, a retired police officer, filed a
complaint against his neighbor Jason Rosenbloom because Rosenbloom put out eight
bags of garbage, two more than the local ordinance limit of six. Soon after,
Rosenbloom confronted Allen at his front door, and the two “exchanged heated
words.”117 From here, the accounts of both parties differ. According to Rosenbloom,
Allen initially closed the door, but then reopened it and, without saying a word, shot
him in the stomach and chest. Allen, on the other hand, said that Rosenbloom had his
foot in the door, attempting to “rush into the house.”118
Because Allen claimed self-defense, the burden was on law enforcement to
determine whether there was probable cause that his two shots were an unlawful use
of force.119 This inquiry is problematic because it requires police officers to not only
engage in legal analysis that is beyond their normal training, but it also requires
police officers to provide evidence that there is an absence of lawful use of force.120
Taken at face value, Allen’s story would give him a conclusive and irrebuttable
presumption121 that he held a “reasonable fear of imminent peril or death,” because,
in his version, Rosenbloom’s attempt to enter his house would mean he was “in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering a . . . residence.” It should not come as
a surprise, then, that the police never arrested Allen, even though Rosenbloom was
unarmed and shot in the front yard. Although this particular provision, which is
essentially an upgraded castle doctrine, may have been intended to protect people
from violent intruders, it will undoubtedly be invoked by anyone who uses deadly
force against someone in his or her house, or even vehicle.122
Even if law enforcement determines there is probable cause that a person used
unlawful force and a prosecutor decides to bring criminal charges, a defendant also
has a right to a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine whether he or she should be
granted immunity.123 During the pretrial immunity hearing, the court determines
“whether the defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
immunity attaches.”124 In 2010, for example, a judge in Palm Beach County granted
immunity to a sixty-five-year-old man named Michael Monahan after he was
charged with first-degree murder for shooting two unarmed men on his sailboat.125

116

See Liptak, supra note 9.

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2016).

120

See Randolph, supra note 71, at 618-19.

121

See JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 77.

122
Section 776.013 could very well have been used by Smiley, since he claimed that
Morningstar tried to reenter his vehicle. If successful, Smiley would have enjoyed a
conclusive presumption that he held a “reasonable fear of imminent peril or death.” See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 776.013(1) (West 2016).
123

Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 463 (Fla. 2010) (adopting the immunity procedure set
forth in Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
124

Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29.
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Monahan, who was physically disabled, claimed the two men cornered him
intending to remove him from the boat.126 Prosecutors stressed that neither man had a
weapon nor had they touched Monahan.127
Proving self-defense cases ending in the death of one person is difficult because
the deceased person is unable to offer his or her side of the story, but the person
claiming self-defense is. Monahan might have been right; both men might have
made verbal threats and they might have intended to act upon them. But what if that
was not the case? What if Monahan acted out of anger, rather than a reasonable fear,
and later offered a fabricated story that conveniently fit into one or more of Florida’s
lawful use of force provisions? This is one of the major flaws in the law and may
help explain why Florida’s justified homicide rate has tripled since the new laws
went into effect.128 “Stand Your Ground” laws give defense attorneys a number of
tools to keep their clients away from the criminal justice system. According to a case
study done by the Tampa Bay Times, which studied nearly two hundred “Stand Your
Ground” cases, in almost a third of the cases analyzed, defendants initiated a
confrontation, and either shot an unarmed person or pursued their victim, and still
avoided criminal prosecution.129 It should not come as a surprise that Florida’s
“Stand Your Ground” laws have been consistently invoked to justify killings ranging
from drug dealers’ turf battles to road rage incidents.130
C. “Stand Your Ground” Laws, Deterrence, and Violent Crime Rates
Until very recently, empirical evidence has been largely absent from the “Stand
Your Ground” law debate. New research on the issue may force some “Stand Your
Ground” law proponents to reevaluate whether increased self-defense laws actually
accomplish their intended purpose. Consider, for example, a quote from
Representative Kevin Calvey who authored a law similar to Florida’s in Oklahoma:
“[“Stand Your Ground” laws are] going to give the crooks second thoughts about
carjacking and things like that. They’re going to get a face full of lead.”131 However,

125

Alexia Campbell, More Accused Hope to Use “Stand Your Ground” Law to Gain
Freedom, SUN SENTINEL (Sept. 12, 2011), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-09-12/news/flboat-shooting-defense-20110912_1_murder-charges-michael-monahan-controversial-statelaw.
126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Op-Ed: Why I Wrote “Stand Your Ground” Law, supra note 105.

129

Hundley et al., supra note 114.

130
John F. Timoney, Op-Ed, Florida’s Disastrous Self-Defense Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/opinion/floridas-disastrous-self-defenselaw.html.
131 Robert Tanner, States Signing on to Deadly Force Law, DAILY HERALD (May 24, 2006),
http://www.heraldextra.com/news/states-move-to-validate-use-of-deadly-force/article_0c0a7f319980-5545-a37e-68d3c90ac961.html. Oklahoma law removes the duty to retreat in any place one
has a right to be, creates a presumption of reasonable fear, and removes civil liability in certain
situations. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (West 2016).
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new research by two economics professors at Texas A&M indicates that “Stand
Your Ground” laws do not deter crime.132
Cheng and Hoekstra’s paper on “Stand Your Ground”133 laws significantly
attempts to conduct empirical research on the effects of the laws. Framing the issue
from an incentives standpoint, the authors hypothesize that laws expanding the legal
justification for the use of legal force would lower the expected cost of using lethal
force while increasing the expected cost of committing violent crime.134 In other
words, with stronger self-defense rights, people will be more willing to use deadly
force (less chance of being prosecuted or even arrested), and potential criminals will
be less likely to engage in violent crime (higher chance that the victim will use
deadly force in self-defense). Despite this logical hypothesis, Cheng and Hoekstra
conclude that while it would be “reasonable to expect that strengthening self-defense
law would deter crime, we find this is not the case.”135
To reach these findings Cheng and Hoekstra examined the twenty-one states that
expanded their castle doctrine to places outside the home136 and compared each
state’s crime data from 2000-2010, using the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (“UCR”).
Cheng and Hoekstra then looked at “within-state” variation, meaning they looked at
the individual state’s crime rate before and after it passed its “Stand Your Ground”
law. Accordingly, the data revealed that “Stand Your Ground” laws did not deter
violent crime specifically the crimes of burglary, robbery, or aggravated assault.137
Cheng and Hoekstra concluded: “Thus, while castle doctrine law may well have
benefits to those legally justified in protecting themselves in self-defense, there is no
evidence that the law provides positive spillovers by deterring crime more
generally.”138
The next issue Cheng and Hoekstra addressed was whether “Stand Your Ground”
laws led to an increase in homicides.139 Recall that Cheng and Hoekstra’s hypothesis
132

Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or
Escalate Violence? Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine, 48 J. HUM. RES. 821, 849
(2013).
133 Cheng and Hoekstra use the term “castle doctrine” and “stand your ground” laws
interchangeably. By “castle doctrine” they are referring to laws that “eliminate the duty to
retreat from a list of specified places, and often remove civil liability for those acting under
the law and establish a presumption of reasonableness as to the beliefs and actions of the
individual claiming self-defense.” Id. at 822.
134

Id.

135

Id. at 849.

136

Stated another way, there are twenty states that have removed the “duty to retreat” in a
place other than the home.
137
Id. at 827. Cheng and Hoekstra use the FBI definitions for burglary (“the unlawful
entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft”), robbery (“the taking or attempting to take
anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat
of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear”), and aggravated assault (“an
unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated
bodily injury”). Id.
138

Id. at 836 (emphasis added).

139

Cheng and Hoekstra define homicide as “the sum of murder and non-negligent
manslaughter.” Id. at 822.
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is that reducing the cost of using deadly force by expanding self-defense rights
would result in more violence. To effectively measure the increased homicide rates,
the authors again observed within-state variation of states that have adopted “Stand
Your Ground” laws. Another important measure was to compare the within-state
variation of “Stand Your Ground” states with the within-state variation of non“Stand Your Ground” states. When comparing different states, Cheng and Hoekstra
normally compared ones in the same geographical region to limit variability
(weather, demographics, etc.). Interestingly, the data showed that the “homicide rates
of [“Stand Your Ground” law] states have a similar trajectory to those of [non“Stand Your Ground” law] states prior to the adoption of the law.”140
Several states that subsequently adopted “Stand Your Ground” laws experienced
a “large and immediate increase in homicides.”141 While some adopting states did
not experience an increase in homicides, they also did not experience the “relative
drop in homicide rates that other states nationwide did.”142 In either scenario, states
with “Stand Your Ground” laws either experienced an increase in their homicide
rate, or, in the event of a decreased rate, did not experience the same degree of
homicide rate decrease as non-adopting states did. Cheng and Hoekstra conclude:
[R]esults indicate that Castle Doctrine laws increase total homicides by
around 8 percent. Put differently, the laws induce an additional 600
homicides per year across the 21 states in our sample that expanded castle
doctrine over this time period. This finding is robust to a wide set of
difference-in-differences specifications, including region-by-year fixed
effects, state-specific linear time trends, and controls for time-varying
factors such as economic conditions, state welfare spending, and policing
and incarceration rates. These findings provide evidence that lowering the
expected cost of lethal force causes there to be more of it.143
A second research paper, written by economists Chandler McClellan and Erdal
Tekin, corroborates Cheng and Hoekstra’s findings, suggesting that “Stand Your
Ground” laws both fail to effectively deter violent crime and also cause an increase
in homicides.144 This corroboration is significant for several reasons: First,
McClellan and Tekin relied on different data; in this case monthly crime data from
the U.S. Vital Statistics (as opposed to UCR data); second, they used slightly more
restrictive criteria for what constitutes a “Stand Your Ground” state; and third, they
also tracked additional data such as emergency room visits and hospital discharges
related to firearm inflicted injuries.145
Focusing specifically on states that abolished the “duty to retreat” (or extended
the “castle doctrine” to places outside the home), they concluded: “In this paper, we
140

Id. at 836 (emphasis added).

141

Id.

142

Id.

143

Id. at 849 (emphasis added).

144

See Chandler B. McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and
Injuries 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18187, 2012),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18187.pdf.
145

Id. at 10-12.
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show[ed] that SYG [“Stand Your Ground”] laws that extend the right to self-defense
to areas outside the home are associated with a significant increase in the number of
homicides.”146 Interestingly, they found that the increase in homicides was
“primarily driven by the deaths among whites, especially white males,” while
finding that there was generally “no effect on blacks.”147 Although these laws may
not directly impact the black community, the percentage of the black population in a
given state is one relevant indicator of whether that state will pass a “Stand Your
Ground” law: “In particular, SYG states have a higher percentage of black
population, more likely to have a Republican governor, a high incarceration rate and
a larger number of law enforcement agents. These states also tend to be more urban,
and have a higher poverty rate.”148
Addressing the issue of what motivated “Stand Your Ground” laws to be passed
in the first place, McClellan and Tekin state:
However, one thing that is clear is that these laws could not have been
introduced as a reaction to a wave of crime epidemic in the states that
have passed these laws. On the contrary, crime rates have been on the
decline virtually everywhere in the U.S. during this period.149
Next, McClellan and Tekin tackle the issue of whether the increase in homicides
is the result of more justifiable killings, which could indicate that the laws are
working as intended.150 Prefacing their findings with the disclaimer that there are
“problems related to the reliability of [the FBI’s Supplemental Homicide Reports]
data, especially with its breakdown of justifiable and non-justifiable homicides,” the
authors conclude the findings show that “SYG laws do in fact cause an increase in
the total homicides including those that fall under the non-justifiable category.”151
One possible explanation for the increase in homicides is that a situation involving a
non-violent criminal encounter (say a trespass, or a theft) between an attacker and a
citizen, which ordinarily would not result in a death for either party, is now more
146

Id. at 31.

147

Id. The authors offer several theories to explain why “Stand Your Ground” laws are
significantly associated with an increase in homicides among white males. First, these laws
may be associated with an increase in gun ownership, and specifically an increase in
concealed carry guns, of which the “overwhelming majority of concealed guns are owned and
carried by white males in the United States.” Id. at 32-33. Second, the laws will have the
biggest effect on those who have knowledge of the laws, and it is “plausible to think that
white males, who are more likely to own and carry guns and who constitute the vast majority
of the membership for pro-gun organizations like the NRA, are the ones who have more
interest in following the legislative activity related to guns.” Id. at 33. Also there is a
“bystander” theory, which reasons that “[i]f gun owners, who are more likely to be white
males, are also more likely to be surrounded by whites and especially white males, then this
may suggest that the SYG law should have a stronger impact on this group.” Id.
148

Id. at 15.

149

Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

150

See Op-Ed: Why I Wrote “Stand Your Ground” Law, supra note 105 (explaining that
Dennis Baxley, the sponsor of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law, suggests that an increase
in “justifiable homicides” indicates that the law is working).
151

McClellan & Tekin, supra note 144, at 25-27.
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likely to result in a death. While the use of lethal force in that situation may or may
not be justified under the circumstances, the authors state that “it cannot be argued in
that case that the SYG laws are saving the lives of innocent people as these
individuals would not have been killed in the first place.”152
There are several flaws in the theory that the increase in overall homicides may
indicate that the laws are working as intended. First, although there has been an
increase in killings labeled “justifiable homicides,” there have also been continued
increases in “non-justifiable homicides.”153 In other words, in application these laws
have not resulted in an increase in “justifiable” homicides; it seems the laws have
simply resulted in more homicides—be they “justifiable” or “non-justifiable.” That
is not to say that these laws have not resulted in any cases of legitimate “justifiable
homicide,” but to draw the categorical conclusion that an increase in overall
homicides is indicative of these laws’ efficacy is naïve and misinformed. Another
reason this conclusion is erroneous is that “the net rise in homicides cannot be
accounted by a one-to-one substitution between the killings of assailants and the
killings of victims unless multiple assailants are killed in some instances.”154 In other
words, for the “Stand Your Ground” proponents’ theory to hold up, there would
need to be a number of instances in which law-abiding citizens killed multiple
assailants, for the numbers to add up properly. This is certainly not impossible, but it
does challenge the credibility of the argument.
In conclusion, McClellan and Tekin specifically single out the “Stand Your
Ground” laws’ abolishment of the “duty to retreat” as the driving force behind the
overall increase in homicides:
Our results suggest that it is indeed the most controversial aspect of
these laws, i.e., the provision that extends no duty to retreat to any place a
person has a legal right to be, that causes the increase in homicides. In
particular, we show strong evidence to indicate that our results are not
driven by other self-defense provisions adopted by states. Taken together,
our findings raise serious doubts against the argument that the stand your
ground laws serve as a deterrent for crime. On the contrary, we show
consistent evidence that these laws are associated with an increase in
crime, at least measured by homicides, especially among white males.155
D. The Politics of the “Stand Your Ground” Movement: Violent Street Crime,
Victimization, and Distrust of the Criminal Justice System
As one digs deeper into the “Stand Your Ground” issue, one interesting question
arises: Why has the “Stand Your Ground” movement enjoyed such a great deal of
political success? As noted previously, proponents of “Stand Your Ground” laws do
not point to any specific criminal cases to justify the laws, nor do they cite any
empirical data to argue that the laws are needed to combat a rise in violent crime

152

Id. at 24.

153

Id. at 32.

154

Id. at 24 (citing Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 132).

155

Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
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rates.156 As it turns out, the success of the movement has little to do with the actual
prevalence of violent crime or the search for legitimate solutions but is rather a
product of powerful political rhetoric. The “Stand Your Ground” movement’s use of
rhetoric to exploit both the public’s fear of violent crime and its distrust of the
criminal justice system’s competency to address properly violent crime is simply a
new application of a time-tested and successful political formula. There are at least
three reasons the “Stand Your Ground” movement has had political success: (1) it
politicizes violent street crime, particularly by using a volitional explanation model;
(2) its justification is centered on protecting the innocent victim; and (3) the laws
encompass the public’s tendency to distrust the criminal justice system, particularly
the discretion that it often gives to judges and juries.
1. The Politicization of Violent Street Crime
In his book Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear legal scholar Jonathan Simon
argues that in the late 1960s, Americans began to build “a new political and civil
order structured around the problem of violent crime.”157 There are several
interesting explanations for this shift, including, the government’s inability to
manage the economy,158 the increase in the public’s experience of crime due to
expanding media coverage (among other factors),159 the constitutional “immunity” of

156 Despite the bleak picture painted by “Stand Your Ground” law proponents, violent crime
rates have actually been decreasing steadily over the past twenty years. See Uniform Crime Reports
(UCRs), Crime in the United States 2012, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_
crime_in_the_united_states_by_volume_and_rate_per_100000_inhabitants_1993-2012.xls
(last
visited Mar. 16, 2016). As the FBI’s table shows, the estimated violent crime rate has decreased
steadily from 1993 to 2013. In those twenty years, the estimated violent crime rate has only gone
up, from year to year, on two occasions, and has overall went from 747.1 in 1993, to 386.9 in 2012
(nearly a twofold reduction). Id. Despite recent evidence that major cities are seeing an increase in
murder rates, see Monica Davey & Micah Smith, Murder Rates Rising Sharply in Many U.S. Cities,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/us/murder-rates-rising-sharplyin-many-us-cities.html?_r=0), the latest FBI UCR Reports show a continued decrease in violent
crime between 2013 and 2014. See Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs), Crime in the United States
2014, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/violent-crime (last visited
Mar. 13, 2016).
157 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 3 (2007). Simon
actually traces the roots of the “war on crime” as far back as Prohibition, but states that “there
is little doubt that the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is the legislative
enactment marking the birth of “governing through crime” in America. Id. at 89-90.
158 Id. at 22 (citing STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME: CRIMINAL
PROCESS AND CULTURAL OBSESSION (1991)) (“[P]oliticization of crime was a response largely
to the governmental crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, when the national government seemed to
stumble in its ability to manage an economy that had produced growing affluence in the 1950s
and 1960s.”).
159

SCHEINGOLD, supra note 158, at 32; see also SIMON, supra note 157, at 24 (“American
crime rates went up in the 1960s, including rates for the kinds of crime that most matter to
ordinary people, such as robberies and stranger murders, and, more important, the experience
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criminalizing and punishing actions,160 the rise of a new conservative movement
built around majority morality and populist punitiveness,161 and even as a way to
implicitly support racism in a society that no longer allowed legal racial segregation
in education and other public accommodations.162 Putting aside a more thorough
examination of these various rationales, the main point is: framing violent “street
crime” as a vitally important social problem that must be addressed by the state has
“offered the least political or legal resistance to government action” and has
provided a means for politicians to gain legitimacy with little or no downside.163
What makes the politicization of violent street crime especially attractive to
politicians in America is that it fits perfectly with existing cultural preferences—
particularly a moralistic culture164 that values “personal responsibility and will over
social context and structural constraints on freedom.”165 Legal scholar Stuart
Scheingold explains that there are two competing theories for viewing street crime:
(1) a structural explanation, which focuses on social disorganization with its roots in
hierarchy, deprivation, coercion, and alienation; and (2) a volitional explanation,
which, by contrast, is associated with individual pathologies—be they moral,
emotional, or genetic.166 In other words, a structural model focuses on “material
conditions of the society” when explaining crime while a volitional model sees crime

of crime increased as well, sometimes directly, but more usually from the media, politicians,
and local knowledge within communities.”).
160 SIMON, supra note 157, at 29 (“Crime has provided a precious wedge for government.
Because the power of the state to criminalize conduct and severely punish violations was one
unquestioned in the Constitution, the ability of the state to take drastic action against
convicted wrongdoers provides an unparalleled constitutional avenue of action.”).
161

Id. (“These were the years in which conservatives were rebuilding themselves and
shaping a new agenda around the themes of the Goldwater campaign, including
anticommunism, states’ rights, mistrust of the New Deal-style government, support for public
enforcement of majority morality, and, already, the rise of street crime.”); id. at 23 (Simon
uses the term “populist punitivism” to describe the “highly moralistic criminal law” policies of
the 1980s).
162

Id. at 25 (citing KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997)) (“Politicians began to turn to crime as a vehicle
for constructing a new political order before the crime boom was recognized. Some, especially
white southern politicians, found crime a convenient line of retreat from explicit support for
legal racial segregation in education and other public accommodations.”).
163

Id. at 31.

164

See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Values, Violence, and the Second Amendment: American
Character, Constitutionalism, and Crime, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 28 (2002) (“[I]f [America is] a
very Protestant, moralistic culture in some broader cultural or spiritual sense, it is not so great
a paradox to say that our national sense of vindictive moralism about disorder leads to
exceptional violence.”).
165

SIMON, supra note 157, at 25.

166

SCHEINGOLD, supra note 158, at 4. Note that Scheingold believes neither model is
sufficient by itself to explain crime. See id. (referring to the structural/volitional dichotomy as
“false and misleading” and stating that “street crime is attributable to an interdependent web
of social forces and individual characteristics.”).
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as a “matter of personal choice.”167 Scheingold suggests that Americans generally
favor volitional explanations due to their “Lockean and Hobbesian premises,” as
opposed to structural explanations rooted in Rousseau and Marx.168 Another way of
explaining the dichotomy is whether criminality is the consequence of flawed
individuals making the wrong choices, or a flawed society failing to offer adequate
alternatives to crime.169
The American preference for a volitional explanation of violent crime is
significant because it is essentially the scaffolding upon which the overarching “war
on crime,” (which includes the “Stand Your Ground” movement) described by
Simon, is built on, politicians who seek legitimacy or political capital by pursuing
legislation designed to curb violent crime, almost always frame it in a volitional
way. Framing violent crime volitionally is not only effective because it conforms
with a large segment of the American public’s views, but also because volitional
explanations, by definition, absolve society of all blame and instead place it entirely
on the perpetrators of violent acts.170 Blaming crime on violent individuals provides
“easy, reassuring, and morally satisfying responses”—namely retributive
punishment.171 Contrast this view with the implications of a structural analysis:
Structural explanations refocus attention from individual criminals to the
criminogenic features of the prevailing social order—ordinarily identified
with extreme inequality. Thus, we are all seen as responsible in some
measure and expected to accept far-reaching, open-ended, and
redistributive changes in the social order. In short, structural
interpretations lead in more contingent directions and call upon more
generous impulses rooted in distant and elusive ideals of social justice.172
Although the volitional explanation of crime seems to be the dominant view in
contemporary American political discourse, this has not always been the case. In the
mid-1900s, most notably during the New Deal era, the prevailing notion was that
“collective security” was best attained through rehabilitative policies and an overall
balancing of risks between criminals and society.173 This “solidarity project,” which
seems to be in line with a structural explanation of crime (or at least partially
structural), led to the creation of institutions like parole, probation, and juvenile
justice.174 This welfarist outlook was ultimately undermined due to the emergence of
inflation, civil disorder, and high crime rates.175
167

Id.

168

Id. at 5. A volitional explanation of crime is also rooted in the “Old Testament with its
prescription for an eye for an eye.” Id. at 21.
169

Id. at 12.

170

Id. at 22.

171

Id. at 6.

172

Id.

173

SIMON, supra note 157, at 23.

174

Id. (citing DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 199 (2001)).

175

SIMON, supra note 157, at 23.
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While it is debatable whether violent criminal acts are more the result of flawed
individuals or a flawed society (and reasonable minds disagree on the issue), it is not
debatable which model garners more political capital in today’s society. One
example that accurately illustrates both the political strengths of a volitional model,
as well as the political weaknesses of a structural or “solidarity project” model, is the
infamous Willie Horton case. During the 1988 presidential election between George
H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis, it came to light that a convicted murderer was
temporarily released from prison as part of a Massachusetts furlough program.176
While free, the escaped prisoner kidnapped a couple, and raped the woman in the
process.177 This information was devastating to the Dukakis campaign because the
incident took place while Dukakis was Governor of Massachusetts. In addition, it
turned out that Dukakis had vetoed a bill that would have instituted the death
penalty, just weeks before Horton was sentenced for his first-degree murder
conviction in 1975.178
Both permitting the furlough program as well as opposing the death penalty
created significant vulnerabilities for Dukakis, which the Bush campaign readily
exploited. Attacks on Dukakis were framed volitionally, as seen by the memorable
Willie Horton ad, which charged Dukakis with “allow[ing] first degree murderers to
have weekend passes from prison” and then describing Horton’s acts of murder,
kidnapping, and rape of innocent victims in gruesome detail.179 The implications,
framed volitionally, were obvious: Dukakis supported a furlough program that
allowed immoral monsters like Willie Horton to kidnap and rape innocent victims;
his opposition to the death penalty granted mercy and leniency to evil and wicked
savages like Horton who are inherently predatory creatures, and deserve the ultimate
punishment.180
Scheingold describes this volitional view, exemplified in the Horton case, as a
“simple morality play,” which liberates society from moral dilemmas.181 Scheingold
176 Roger Simon, How a Murderer and Rapist Became the Bush Campaign’s Most
Valuable Player, BALT. SUN (Nov. 11, 1990), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1990-1111/features/1990315149_1_willie-horton-fournier-michael-dukakis.
177

Id.

178

Id.

179
Willie
Horton
1998
Attack
Ad,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io9KMSSEZ0Y.

YOUTUBE

(Nov.

3,

2008),

180

Some believe that there was also a racial component to the Horton strategy: namely to
“play[ ] on fears of black criminals.” Opinion, George Bush and Willie Horton, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/04/opinion/george-bush-and-williehorton.html. Willie Norton was depicted as:
He was big. He was black. He was every guy you ever crossed the street to avoid,
every pair of smoldering eyes you ever looked away from on the bus or subway. He
was every person you moved out of the city to escape, every sound in the night that
made you get up and check the locks on the windows and grab the door handles and
give them an extra tug. Whether you were white or black or red or yellow, Willie
Horton was your worst nightmare.
Simon, supra note 176.
181

SCHEINGOLD, supra note 158, at 21-22.
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then states why a structural explanation is often considered inadequate, and also
suggests that a volitional view is necessary to effectively politicize crime:
It is hard to see how any comparably consoling myth could be derived
from either structural criminology or from the complexities of hard-core
criminological discourse. Indeed, insofar as the stick of punishment is the
objective, it is not only structural criminology that is marginalized. Also
unwelcome are the non-punitive forms of volitional criminology – the
carrots of job training, drug rehabilitation, and other liberal measures. We
do not want to hear that we are all responsible or that there is no quick fix.
That would amount to giving up the consoling certainties of crime and
punishment, the basic reason for reframing social problems as criminal
problems.182
Thus, the problem with structural explanations is that they are simply not as
politically compelling as volitional explanations. Nobody wants to hear that violent
crime often results from “economic marginality” or “purposelessness, alienation, and
deprivation.”183 Instead, many people adopt the belief system, which Scheingold
calls “the myth of crime and punishment,” in which problems of “race, economic
productivity, moral conflict, and poverty” are neatly bundled up and thought of as
“street crime,” and where criminals are viewed as “unknown predators who seek out
opportunities to prey upon us and disrupt our lives.”184 The Willie Horton case from
the 1988 election is just one of many examples where politicians embraced crime
control and a volitional view of crime to further political ends.185
Turning to the “Stand Your Ground” movement, one can see how its
justifications and rhetoric are deeply rooted in a volitional explanation of crime. For
example, take the suggestion by Marion Hammer, former President of the NRA, that
a court applying the common-law “duty to retreat” rule would require a woman to
retreat even if someone “tried to drag [her] into an alley to rape her.”186 Although
this language invokes the image of the “innocent victim,” it also plays right into the
good versus evil, highly moralistic view of criminals as “unknown predators who
seek out opportunities to prey upon us.”187 There is no mention of any potential
adverse effects of how removing the “duty to retreat” might affect an encounter
between two seemingly law-abiding citizens, like in the Kenneth Allen-Jason
182

Id. at 22.
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Id. at 11 (citing ELLIOT CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME 117 (1986)).

184

Id. at 21.
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Two other famous examples include: President Richard Nixon’s criticism of the
Warren Court for being too favorable towards criminals, and his subsequent appointments of
Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, and William Rehnquist, who were picked, in part, for their
“readiness to strengthen the constitutional position of law enforcement,” see SIMON, supra
note 157, at 53, and then-Governor Bill Clinton’s dramatic departure from the New
Hampshire primary during his 1992 presidential campaign to “oversee an execution of an
Arkansas prisoner with limited mental capacity who had killed a police officer,” id. at 58-59.
Contrast these with the political backlash that President Gerald Ford endured after pardoning
Nixon, following his resignation. Id. at 56.
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Rosenbloom incident.188 A nuanced structural analysis that looks at the potential
societal consequences of laws that de-criminalize certain uses of lethal force is
rarely, if ever, discussed.
What effect will a law that gives homeowners free reign to use deadly force
against harmless, non-violent juvenile trespassers have on our “collective security”?
Is absolute personal security so paramount that it trumps any notion of a “solidarity
project” or furthering civic virtue? Jonathan Simon argues that “practices that
sacrifice civic virtue in the name of personal security against lethal violence” might
actually undermine security:
Repressing violence is a task of first order for governance of all sorts, but
we must reverse the perception that violence frees its potential victims of
all responsibilities for the well-beings of others or the burdens of
collective survival. Moreover, politics must remind people of the
securities that emerge from social solidarity.189
2. The Imagined Possibility of Victimization
Closely tied to the justification for politicizing violent street crime is the need to
protect the “vulnerabilities and needs of victims.”190 The reverence for the crime
victim191 as an “idealized subject of the law” not only extends to the actual
“experience of victimization” but also includes “(much more commonly) the
imagined possibility of victimization.”192 This latter category is significant for at least
three reasons: (1) it encompasses a significant segment of the population,
particularly “white, suburban, middle-class”193 individuals who, even if they have
not been the victims of violent crime, nonetheless live in fear that it could happen at
any moment; (2) it fits nicely with the volitional and moralistic explanation of
violent crime and fosters an “us against them” mentality; and (3) by bringing such a
large portion of society under the umbrella of “potential victims,” it creates a
political culture where any legislation that is passed in the name of “crime victims”
is seen as standing for the “general good.”194
According to David Garland, not only are victims an important subject of the
law, but their interests are also “counter-posed” against the offender’s interests. This
188

See supra Part II.B.
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Jonathan Simon, Guns, Crime, and Governance, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 133, 148 (2002).
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SIMON, supra note 157, at 76.
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Janet Reno, former Attorney General for President Bill Clinton had this to say about
victims:
I draw most of my strength from victims for they represent America to me: people
who will not be put down, people who will not be defeated, people who will rise again
and again for what is right . . . you are my heroes and heroines. You are but little
lower than the angels.
Id. at 89.
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counter-position creates a zero-sum game where any concern for a criminal suspect’s
rights is seen as an affront to the victims:
The new political imperative is that victims must be protected, their
voices must be heard, their memory honoured, their anger expressed, their
fears addressed. The rhetoric of penal debate routinely invokes the figure
of the victim— typically a child or a woman or a grieving family
member— as a righteous figure whose suffering must be expressed and
whose security must henceforth be guaranteed. Any untoward attention to
the rights or welfare of the offender is taken to detract from the
appropriate measure of respect for victims. A zero-sum policy game is
assumed wherein the offender’s gain is the victim’s loss, and being ‘for’
victims automatically means being tough on offenders.195
There are many examples of this “zero-sum policy game” at work in politics.
One example is the California gubernatorial election of 1966 in which Ronald
Reagan soundly defeated incumbent Pat Brown. Although Pat Brown, as the
Governor of California, imposed the death penalty, he declared publicly that he
opposed it on religious and moral grounds.196 Reagan attacked Brown’s position by
suggesting that he was “valuing cold-blooded killers’ lives over their victims’
lives.”197 Bill Clinton’s “dramatic departure from the New Hampshire primary
during his 1992 presidential campaign to ‘oversee an execution of an Arkansas
prisoner with limited mental capacity who had killed a police officer’”198 was likely
motivated in part by his desire to identify with the police officer who had been the
victim of a violent murder. Lastly, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994199 contained several provisions targeted at crime victims, including
guidelines to enhance punishment for violent assaults committed against elderly
victims, and an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
allows victims the opportunity to speak at sentencing hearings.200
This zero-sum game between criminals and victims is especially prevalent in the
“Stand Your Ground” rhetoric. Consider this exchange between NPR Radio’s Neal
Conan and Dennis Baxley, who sponsored the “Stand Your Ground” legislation in
Florida:
CONAN: Before your law, Florida law said that if there's a safe line of
retreat— and this is still the case in many states—someone who's
threatened has an obligation to take those steps back before resort to
force. What's wrong with that?

195
GARLAND, supra note 174, at 11. One way the feelings and interests of victims is
expressed is by naming laws after them: “Megan’s law; Jenna’s law; the Brady bill.” Id.
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BAXLEY: The duty to retreat puts the person at great risk, and it's a
Monday morning quarterback situation. We can all sit and analyze for
hours what someone could have done. But in fact, a victim of a violent
attack has seconds to decide if they want to live or they want to die or
they want to be a victim of violence, such as rape or a beating. And I
think in those circumstances, we need to give that law-abiding citizen the
benefit of the doubt and stand beside them and say if you can stop a
violent act from occurring that's going to victimize you and your family,
that we're going to stand with you.
CONAN: There are those who say that, I think, since this law went into
effect the number of cases described as justifiable homicide has tripled in
Florida.
BAXLEY: I think that actually indicates that the law is working because
it says that a number of people have not been prosecuted for defending
themselves. It says that in those cases, the perpetrator bore the brunt of
their choice rather than being able to brutalize or victimize another
person.201
Baxley’s message is clear: “Stand Your Ground” laws are justified because they
are designed to protect a specific class: law-abiding victims of violent attacks. In
addition, there is also the suggestion that those in favor of the common-law “duty to
retreat” are not only putting people “at great risk” but are also unwilling to “stand
with” law-abiding citizens, nor willing to give law-abiding citizens “the benefit of
the doubt.” Baxley’s assessment that the tripling of the justifiable homicide rate
“indicates that the law is working” is premised on the zero-sum formula between
victims and criminals: by empowering potential victims, it is criminals who now
bear “the brunt of their choice” and are no longer able to “brutalize or victimize”
others.
3. The Public’s Distrust of the Criminal Justice System
One consistent justification for “Stand Your Ground” laws is various actors in
the criminal justice system, including law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and
juries, are unfit to properly determine whether the use of lethal force was lawful or
not.202 Whether this is true or not, the concern is deeply embedded in the Florida law,
which creates various presumptions that force was lawfully used, and also adds a
criminal immunity provision which prohibits law enforcement officers from
arresting a person claiming self-defense “unless [they] determine that there is
probable cause that the force that was used or threatened was unlawful.”203
The idea of blaming the “system,” and particularly pointing to judicial
discretionary as a problematic hindrance in the fight against crime is a tried-and-true
method for politicians. As Simon explains in Governing Through Crime, there are
“two principles underlying the federal crime legislation model:”
(1) The system is the problem; (2) the victim is the key. Nothing has
moved legislatures more than the idea that public safety has been
201
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sacrificed to the convenience or indifference of the judiciary and the
correctional bureaucracy. Since the 1970s, a steady flow of laws has
attacked virtually every step of the criminal justice system for decisions
perceived as favorable to criminals, ranging from bail law, to the insanity
defense, to sentencing law, to corrections law. Discretion at any of these
steps is viewed as something being used to favor criminals.204
In this same vein, the idea of a judge or jury “second-guessing” one who claims selfdefense by questioning whether “there was a completely safe avenue of retreat,” is
viewed, perhaps ironically, as favoring the “criminal” against whom the “lawabiding” citizen was defending himself.205 What is interesting about these laws, as
opposed to a lot of the criminal reforms of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, is that the focus
is not on shifting the balance from criminal suspects to law enforcement, or from
judges to prosecutors, but instead on essentially de-criminalizing the use of lethal
force by taking it out of the system entirely. In other words, it is not just judicial
discretion that is problematic, but rather discretion among all criminal justice actors.
CONCLUSION
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law has been extremely controversial, and yet it
enjoys an increasing amount of political success across the nation. “Stand Your
Ground” laws are particularly problematic because they destroy the necessity
element, disrupt the criminal justice system, and ultimately fail in their goal to deter
crime. What is particularly worrisome about these laws is they seem to be the result
of a systematic political movement by the NRA rather than a solution to a societal
problem. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that crime rates were actually on the
decline prior to the laws’ passages in various states.
The “Stand Your Ground” movement has been particularly effective because it is
able to successfully politicize and exploit the public’s fear of violent street crime.
These laws are further justified by their stated desire to protect innocent crime
victims, and also to take power away from actors in the criminal justice system that
are likely to second-guess the actions of law-abiding citizens. This movement raises
serious concerns about how powerful ideologies and special interest groups can
seemingly shape and influence policy regardless of whether it is truly in the state’s
best interest. As former Miami Police Chief, John Timoney put it, “The only thing
that is worse than a bad law is an unnecessary law. Clearly, this was the case
here.”206
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